I. Introduction
A. Background on Ghana’s Economy
The Ghanaian economy is often described as one of immense potential and capability. This is because, despite existing for more than six decades, the Ghanaian economy still has many areas and sectors that are devoid of great investment and diverse exposure. With an estimated population of over 30 million people,[1] rankings of 1st and 2nd for exports of gold[2] and cocoa respectively across the African continent, one can only wonder what would be possible if sufficient investments were made across all industries.
These possibilities however present a dual-edged sword. The dearth of investments does not only provide a lot of potential but it has also resulted in a lack of political will to effectively regulate large segments of the Ghanaian economy. Thus, the Ghanaian economy has rudimentary regimes on matters like Consumer Protection, Labour Protection, Antitrust Regulation, Environmental Protection and so on and so forth. This leaves ordinary citizens and other stakeholders at risk of exploitation. This article seeks to foray into one of the aforementioned areas to expose the gaps that exist in the regulatory regime.
B. Importance of Competition Laws
If one randomly asked a Senior High School student what the two types of national economic structures are, most students would easily answer stating Socialism and Capitalism (or a Free Market Economy). Same student would easily say that that Socialism refers to the economic system where the state centralises control of market forces within itself and also controls the distribution of resources with minimal private involvement. Capitalism on the other hand involves minimal state involvement in the distribution and utilisation of resources. Private persons set up companies and legal entities through which they employ other private persons, provide services, and sell goods. The Ghanaian system is oft described as a mixed system since the state maintains control of some sectors of the economy, particularly those that are deemed to be essential (eg. Ghana Water Company Limited or Ghana Broadcasting Corporation).
A feature of efficient Capitalist Systems is state regulation. This is because absolute capitalism (devoid of state regulation) breeds chaos. The primary aim of corporations is the making of profit, and without regulatory oversight, corporations may resort to dubious practices, such as compromising quality assurance by cutting corners, underpaying employees, exploiting resources beyond sustainable limits, engaging in environmental pollution, and employing anti-competitive tactics to stifle potential competitors. The necessity for regulation becomes evident as a means to establish a framework that ensures ethical business conduct, protects workers’ rights, preserves environmental integrity, and promotes fair competition within the capitalist system.
In essence, state regulation acts as a critical counterbalance to the profit-centric motives of corporations, steering them towards responsible and sustainable practices. It serves as a protective mechanism, preventing the negative externalities associated with unbridled capitalism and fostering an environment where economic activities contribute positively to societal well-being.
One such form of regulation is Antitrust or Competition Law. These laws seek to ensure that there exists a level playing field amongst corporations in the market. This sort of regulation takes on many forms. It includes requiring regulatory approval for mergers and acquisitions of dominant players in certain industries, supervising joint ventures carried out by dominant companies to prevent cartel behaviour, preventing firms from bundling their services together to limit consumer choice, and the like.
C. Statement of the Problem: Market Dominance and Abuse of Power
Antitrust laws are incredibly important to control the excesses of corporate power. Whilst the growth of a company is not wrong by itself, companies can however grow to levels that may generally negatively impact the collective good. A company with access to the primary means of entry into a market may make it harder for new players to enter the said market. Take Amazon, the multinational conglomerate, for example. Amazon primarily operates a virtual marketplace that has become so ubiquitous that essentially every seller or supplier who wishes to provide their goods to the larger market must list their products on Amazon and pay a commission to the site. What happens then when Amazon also starts listing its own products for sale?[3] The small business owner would then be competing with the conglomerate which has excess revenue to enable them undercut the seller and also has algorithms to list Amazon’s products higher in search results and possibly bury the small seller’s products.[4]
For the ordinary consumer, this really does not sound so bad. After all, they would be paying less for the same product. However, the average consumer seldom considers the long-term macroeconomic repercussions. The fewer competing sellers there are in a market, the more the existing sellers are able to control the industry. This control can be abused in various ways. A dominant market player may make government unpopular by frustrating customers. They may increase prices knowing that consumers have no viable alternatives, they may lobby lawmakers to pass rules favourable to them and detrimental to other stakeholders, they may bundle their services into other markets to takeover those markets, and suchlike.
Even outside of abusive practices, there are inherent dangers to a lack of competition in a market. The first of these dangers is a lack of innovation. Competition breeds advancements and innovations in a particular market. Take, for example, the MTN story; a lot of people readily attribute advancements in telecommunications in Ghana to MTN. These include easy access to SIM card registration, Mobile Money and 4G services. All of the foregoing happened because the company sought to secure an edge over its competitors. Without competition, they would have no reason to try to be better. This is why markets with large numbers of suppliers (think sachet water or public transportation) often have their goods or services remaining cheap since alternatives are readily available to consumers. Relying on only one service is also dangerous since the failure of that service would grind the entire industry to a halt. In essence, a thriving marketplace with healthy competition not only sparks innovation but also ensures resilience and affordability for consumers, underscoring the necessity for vigilant regulatory measures to safeguard the vitality of competition in various industries.
II. Literature Review
A. Overview of Competition Laws in Ghana
Antitrust laws in Ghana are unfortunately quite fragmented. As was stated in the introductory part of this essay, there has not been sufficient political will to regulate competition effectively. Thus, what exist presently are mostly sections of laws that can be loosely interpreted as applying to antitrust scenarios. Specific legislations targeted at maximising competition are quite limited.
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana which serves as the basis for the Ghana Legal System does not have a provision dedicated explicitly to antitrust law. It does however provide some general basis for legislating such specific laws. Particularly, under Article 36, the Constitution provides thus:
- The State shall take all necessary action to ensure that the national economy is managed in such a manner as to maximize the rate of economic development and to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every person in Ghana and to provide adequate means of livelihood and suitable employment and public assistance to the needy.
- The State shall, in particular, take all necessary steps to establish a sound and healthy economy whose underlying principles shall include –
- affording ample opportunity for individual initiative and creativity in economic activities and fostering an enabling environment for a pronounced role of the private sector in the economy;
- The State shall afford equality of economic opportunity to all citizens; and, in particular, the State shall take all necessary steps so as to ensure the full integration of women into the mainstream of the economic development of Ghana.
Specific to education, also, is Clause 2 of Article 25 which states:
- Every person shall have the right, at his own expense, to establish and maintain a private school or schools at all levels and of such categories and in accordance with such conditions as may be provided by law.
Reading these provisions purposively may provide basis for the enforcement of Antitrust Legislation since such legislation, as has been stated above, is fundamentally targeted at ensuring that the market is free and open to all persons who wish to participate in same whilst preventing unjustified monopolies.
As has already been stated, Ghana’s regime on antitrust law is quite fragmented. This is because they exist only within certain sectors. One such law is the Protection Against Unfair Competition Act, 2001 (Act 589). This Act, although aimed at ensuring fair market practices, focuses on the use of intellectual property to restrict the business of another. Primarily, it focuses on the use of the image or likeness of the intellectual property of another business in a manner that is inconsistent with fair business practices. It also creates a civil remedy for actual or threatened breaches of the act by way of application to the court by the victim.[5] Even with regard to intellectual property, the applicability of the Act is still very limited. It focuses on scenarios where one person uses the intellectual property of another, but it does not particularly address scenarios in which the owner of the property uses the Intellectual Property to prevent others from entering the market.[6]
One would also expect the Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992) to have some degree of regulation since it is the general enactment that regulates companies in Ghana. This is not the case unfortunately. The Act does not provide any specific limitations on corporate power to prevent anti-competitive behaviour. One common antitrust tactic is the acquisition of smaller competing firms by dominant companies. It is quite unfortunate to note that the limitations that exist in the act for mergers and acquisitions do not consider the possibility of them being anticompetitive. Thus, any form of regulation regarding such processes will be sector-specific.
It is therefore left to regulators of specific industries to make attempts at regulating against anticompetitive practices. Hence, Section 54(3) of the Banks and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2016 (Act 930)[7] gives the Bank of Ghana the discretion to deny an application for approval of sale of businesses, mergers, amalgamations, or reconstructions of the institutions within the scope of the Act[8] if, in the opinion of the BoG, such a transaction would have substantial effects on competition in the sector.
Additionally, the new Insurance Act, 2021 (Act 1061) which establishes the National Insurance Commission mandates, under Section 4(e), the Commission to be guided by the need to ensure effective competition in the insurance sector in the best interest of consumers. The Act further requires the approval of the Commission for mergers or acquisitions under Sections 85 to 88. A combined reading of Section 4(e) and 88 provides strong indication that the need to promote competition would constitute basis to reject an application brought under Section 85.
An even better example is the National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 (Act 691)[9] which establishes the National Petroleum Authority as the regulator of corporations in the Petroleum Sector, an industry that is arguably noted historically for anticompetitive practices. The Act empowers the Authority to specifically take action against cartels and monopolies under Section 43.
Another regulator, the National Communications Authority, also has the authority to review corporate activity in a manner that encourages competition in the market. The Electronic Communications Act, 2008 (Act 775)[10] stipulates in its sections a general duty on all licensees under the Act not to engage in anti-competitive practices and further stipulates, unlike the aforementioned enactments, additional specific duties that must be undertaken by companies determined to be Significant Market Players to maintain some fairness in the system. Also, unlike the other sector regulators aforementioned, it seems the NCA has been the only one to specifically enforce the rules on anticompetitive behaviour.[11] A counter to that would be the argument that the wording of Act 775 creates a specific statutory duty on the regulator to so act and it thus was not really a matter of choice.
B. Decided Cases on Competition
Most of the case law in Ghanaian courts on competition relate to the application of the Protection Against Unfair Competition Act, 2001 (Act 589) or the tort of passing off. Cases including Prophetess Thane II v. Prophet George; [12] Interworld Products (GH) Ltd. V. Lava Limited;[13] PRG Watch Manufacturing Limited v. Joseph Attakora;[14] Fruit Basket Ltd v. I-Shop Ltd;[15] Kapman AB v. Simater Company Ltd;[16] Living Faith World Outreach Centre & Ors V. The Registrar-General & Ors[17] relate to the tort of passing off which entitles a plaintiff to a claim of damages where the plaintiff is able to successfully prove that the defendant has unduly employed the likeness of the plaintiff’s business in order to benefit from the goodwill of the defendant in the market. As was stated earlier, this is also provided for under Act 589. Other relevant cases, including Accra Brewery Company Ltd. v. Guinness Ghana Ltd,[18] are on contracts in restraint of trade where two parties enter into an agreement limiting the right of one or both parties to purchase from or sell to third parties to the agreement. Although, passing off and trade restraints may be forms of unfair competition, they do not fall squarely within the anti-competitive measures discussed in this essay which involve a larger company taking advantage of its dominant position to unduly disadvantage its competitors.
These were the essential facts that led to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ghana Telecom Company Ltd. Vs. Internet Ghana Ltd (Consolidated).[19] The brief facts of this case are that the parties entered into an agreement where the Appellant would support the Respondent with its technical services and equipment to enable the Respondent to provide internet service to consumers. Notably, at the time the contract was entered into, the Appellant party had not been providing retail internet services to the general public. However, not long after, the Appellant did in fact begin to provide such services even going as far as providing them for free to consumers in a bid to get consumers to choose its services over those of the Respondent. Without delving too greatly into the issues determined in the matter, it is quite clear on the face of it that the Appellant partly was abusing its dominant position since it was obviously better placed to provide such services over the Respondent who, in addition to paying hefty service charges, now had to contend with a competitor who was providing the same services for free, and this was obviously injurious to its business. It is also instructive to note the dictum of Adjei J.A. where, in dismissing the appeal and upholding the decision of the trial court in favour of the Respondent, he points out that the actions of the Appellant could not be sufficiently covered by Act 589 and that, if anything, only the omnibus ground under Section 7 could be interpreted to cover the actions of the Appellant. It is unclear if the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal intended to point out the limitations of the Act, but nevertheless, the case demonstrates the deficiency of the Act.
C. Global Perspectives on Addressing Market Dominance
Addressing market dominance through an effective antitrust regime has become a relevant feature in economies that are at the upper end of the development scale. Such states recognise the dangers posed by unchecked corporate power. They understand that, similar to unchecked state power, the innate human desire to collect power and strength will motivate corporate power to trample on the freedoms and interests of others. Accordingly, these states have implemented regulatory regimes to ensure that corporate power is not unfettered.
The absolute trailblazer in this area of law is the European Union (EU). Arguably, antitrust regulation is even more relevant for a supranational economic structure such as the EU where market dominance in the single market poses an even greater risk for all others. This is why the Treaty on The Functioning of The European Union[20] dedicates an entire chapter[21] to encouraging competition. Thus, the Union, particularly through the European Commission,[22] takes steps to ensure the market is kept competitive. A good example of such regulatory activity is the passing of the Digital Markets Act which is meant to regulate firms within the digital space. Under this Act, a company may be characterised or designated as a “gatekeeper” with such designation being accompanied by certain duties to avoid activities that prevents competitors from participating in the market or disincentivising customers from switching to competitors. Apple, the US-based international tech giant, was recently compelled to adopt certain changes from the Union including allowing side-loading[23] and greater third-party software access to devices in the European Union.[24]
The United States of America (US)is quite obviously worthy of consideration. The US practices a dual-agency system with both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) acting as enforcers of antitrust laws in America. The FTC often takes an oversight role, assessing transactions for compliance with antitrust laws, but it may still take action against firms that have acted contrary to best practice through fines. The DOJ on the other hand often takes on prosecutorial roles and often only steps in with matters involving significant criminality like the infamous Vitamin Cartel in the 1990s.[25] The statutory regime for regulating antitrust conduct in America is three-fold. First, there is the Sherman Act of 1890 which prohibited malicious anti-competitive behaviour across state lines and was used in notable cases such as the United States v. AT&T[26] and the United States v. Microsoft.[27] The Sherman Act was then followed by the Clayton Act of 1914 which was more specific in stating the anticompetitive behaviour (such as price discrimination and mergers and acquisitions) and providing further protections for Labour Rights. The final[28] Act that provides the basis for regulation of Anticompetitive behaviour is the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 which established the FTC and provided further regulatory powers over corporate power.
In Africa, South Africa also stands as a pioneer in competition regulation with its proactive regime for preventing antitrust behaviour. The Competition Commission of South Africa as established by the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 oversees corporate transactions for their effects on competition. The Act also prohibits anti-competitive conduct in both broad and narrow terms. The Act even goes further in establishing a Competition Tribunal and a Competition Appeals Court with three judges of the High Court. The Commission undertakes many activities including providing guidelines on mergers and acquisitions,[29] conducting probes into financial manipulation by banks,[30] amongst others.
III. Analysing Gaps in Current Legislation and Proposing Reforms
A. Weaknesses in Definitions and Thresholds
The main issue with the Ghanaian regulatory framework lies in its fragmentation, which undermines effective antitrust enforcement. Currently, only certain regulators are empowered to address antitrust behaviour, leading to significant gaps in oversight across various sectors of the economy. Moreover, even the existing sector-regimes are still very incompetent. As stated above, it is only the Electronic Transactions Act (Act 775)[31] that specifically stipulates thresholds for determining market dominance and further compels the dominant company to take specific steps to ensure fairness. This is a huge problem as an economy is obviously not only comprised of Telecommunications Companies. Given that antitrust behaviour can manifest in any industry, the absence of comprehensive statutory provisions poses a significant challenge for regulators in identifying and combating such practices. Consequently, the current regulatory landscape in Ghana lacks the requisite tools and authority to adequately tackle antitrust issues, resulting in an overly laissez-faire approach to competition enforcement.
Additionally, firms may grow so large that they are able to branch into other sectors. When this happens, a fragmented approach would mean that they would be partly under one regulator and under another (if that regulator has antitrust powers). Take Samsung in South Korea, for example, Samsung provides services in construction, the more popularly known consumer electronics, financial services, shipbuilding, and medical services. In a fragmented regulatory environment like ours, such a conglomerate would fall under the jurisdiction of multiple regulators, each with varying degrees of antitrust authority. This would lead to bureaucratic hurdles and inefficiencies as regulators attempt to share information and coordinate efforts to identify and address anticompetitive behaviour.
B. Enforcement Challenges
The second limitation of the Ghanaian regime relates to the regulators themselves. This particular limitation is two-pronged. The first being a consequence of the aforementioned fragmented issue. An assessment of the competition regimes from other jurisdictions indicates that there is often a dedicated statutory body that monitors and regulates all parts of the economy for antitrust behaviour. The United Kingdom has the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA),[32] Australia has the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC),[33] Japan has the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC),[34] Nigeria has the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC),[35] among numerous others. Some countries like the US, South Africa and some Member States of the EU even have multiple agencies tasked with combating anticompetitive behaviour. It is therefore quite disappointing that no such agency or commission exists presently in Ghana to protect anti-competitive behaviour.[36]
The second prong of the enforcement problem is a lack of political will. The creation of bodies and formulation of policies, no matter how comprehensive will be immaterial without the necessary political will to accomplish these goals. This lack of will is evident firstly by the absence of sufficient statutory backing. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the NCA-MTN fiasco, regulatory enforcement against companies particularly those that employ and/or provide services for a significant portion of the population can very easily result in public dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction can easily turn into disdain for the government of the day thus disincentivising the state from even taking regulatory action against a company.
C. Inadequate Penalties for Violations
As stated prior, the absence of strict legislation in the Ghanaian Antitrust space provides no incentives for companies to conduct themselves in a manner that encourages competition. Other regimes have laws that provide regulators with broad swathes of action that can be undertaken against companies subject, of course, to judicial review. These regulatory measures include blocking transactions and acquisitions, ordering the breakup of companies that have grown too large, requiring significant players to grant their competitors access to proprietary tools and technology, amongst others.
There is also, quite obviously, criminal prosecution for those who engage in more egregious instances of anti-competitive behaviour such as the aforementioned Vitamin Cartel. These regulatory measures serve as strong incentives to companies to play fair with each other. Companies cannot be left to conduct themselves as they please in a market; some degree of regulation is necessary.
D. Lack of Protection for Domestic Firms
There is also the need to improve the current regime to better protect indigenous businesses. Admittedly, the Ghana Investment Promotion (GIPC) Act, 2013 (Act 865) was passed for this same purpose. It is humbly submitted that all the act does with regards to protecting indigenous businesses is to reserve certain industries for domestic businesses and impose Ghanaian participation requirements for certain industries. It should go without saying that this is woefully inadequate as a foreign firm with cashflows far greater than Ghanaian companies can still abuse the present system to the detriment of competition in the market. It is therefore further relevant to shore up our regime on competition laws.
IV. Conclusion
As pointed out in this essay, the Ghanaian regulatory regime on Competition in the Free Market is woefully inadequate. This inadequacy manifests by way of fragmented enforcement, a dearth in political will and a lack of punishments for unethical activity. This leaves the economy and its particular industries quite vulnerable to the whims of corporate greed. It is extremely important that the regime is shored up and the necessary checks are put in place to protect against manipulation. This is especially important in light of the establishment of the AfCFTA as a means of ensuring that the resources of the Continent are primarily enjoyed by people of the Continent.
This article is by no means a first in calls for a better regulatory system. Appeals have consistently been made by experts in the field and civil society organisations for the necessary legislative action to implement a robust economy.[37] In 2019, the then Minister of Trade and Industry stated that Cabinet was considering a draft Competition Bill meant to be aligned with the provisions of the Competition Protocol of the second phase of negotiations the AfCFTA.[38] Unfortunately, such a bill has yet to result in an Act of Parliament. And with this article being written in an election year, it cannot be said that there is much to go on in the nature of hope to see such an enactment passed anytime soon. One would always hate to be a harbinger of doom and dread, but the urgency with which such regulation is required cannot possibly be overstated. Industries are ripe for the picking by corporations that have the means to take advantage of the lax nature of the regulatory system. Thus, this author can only join his voice to the many others that have called for the same thing- Regulation.
[1] Ghana Statistical Service, 2021 Population and Housing Census: General Report, Volume 3A, November 2021. Accessible from <https://statsghana.gov.gh/gssmain/fileUpload/pressrelease/2021%20PHC%20General%20Report%20Vol%203A_Population%20of%20Regions%20and%20Districts_181121.pdf>
[2] Mining.com. (2021, June 14). Top 10 gold producing countries. <https://www.mining.com/web/top-10-gold-producing-countries/>
[3] As they presently do with their Amazon Basics line of products.
[4] See Farronato, C. (n.d.). Understanding the Tradeoffs of the Amazon Antitrust Case. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2024/01/understanding-the-tradeoffs-of-the-amazon-antitrust-case#:~:text=The%20FTC’s%20complaint%20alleges%20that,abuse%20of%20a%20dominant%20position.
[5] See Section 8 of Act 589
[6] Although Section 7 provides an omnibus provision to allow applications for activities in the course of
industrial or commercial activities that are “contrary to honest practices”.
[7] Per the long title, the Act was enacted to: “amend and consolidate the laws relating to deposit-taking; to regulate institutions which carry on deposit-taking business, and to provide for related matters.”
[8] Per Section 1 of the Act, it applies to (a) banks, (b) specialised deposit-taking institutions, (c) financial holding companies, and (d) affiliates of banks, specialised deposit-taking institutions, and financial holding companies.
[9] The long title of the Act states that it was enacted to: “establish the National Petroleum Authority to regulate, oversee and monitor activities in the petroleum downstream industry; to establish a Unified Petroleum Price Fund; and to provide for related matters.”
[10] As amended by the Electronic Communications (Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act 1006)
[11] See < https://nca.org.gh/2020/09/01/high-court-dismisses-mtns-case-contesting-the-ncas-decision-to-declare-them-as-a-smp-in-ghana/>
[12] [1977] 1 GLR 467
[13] CA. 34/2003 · 16 FEB 2004 · Unreported, Court of Appeal)
[14] Suit No: MISC/22/12 · 17 OCT 2013 (Unreported)
[15] Suit No: IPR/05/14 · 30th May 2017 (Unreported)
[16] Suit No: CM/IPR/0522/18 · 29 JUN 2021 (Unreported)
[17] Suit No: J4/49/2021 · 17 MAY 2023 · (Unreported)
[18] Suit No: CS 307/99, 28th May 1999. (Unreported)
[19] Consolidated Suit No: H1/82/2022, Appellate decision of 5th December, 2022 (Unreported)
[20] The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is one of the two main treaties that form the constitutional basis of the European Union (EU), along with the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
[21] CHAPTER I of TITLE VII of The Treaty on The Functioning of The European Union
[22] The European Commission acts as the second organ of the Executive arm of the European Commission.
[23] Sideloading refers to installing applications from web sources that are not vendor-approved. Apple approves only apps installed through its App Store which allows it to take significant commissions from developers. Side-Loading would allow developers to offer their apps on the internet thereby circumventing such fees.
[24] https://www.reuters.com/technology/apple-faces-strong-action-if-app-store-changes-fall-short-eus-breton-says-2024-01-26/
[25] See Molitor N, “The Rise and Fall of the Vitamin Cartel – Dr. Rath Health Foundation” (Dr. Rath Health Foundation, November 11, 2020) <https://www.dr-rath-foundation.org/2019/09/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-vitamin-cartel/>
[26] United States of America v. AT&T Co. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D. D.C. 1982).
[27] United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
[28] Other enactments do exist including the Robinson–Patman Act of 1936, Celler–Kefauver Act of 1950, the Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 but these amended existing laws.
[29] Nazeera Mia. (2022, February 9). Africa: Competition Law – A year in Review, 2021 – Bowmans. Bowmans – Corporate and Commercial Law Firm | Corporate Lawyers | Attorneys. https://bowmanslaw.com/insights/competition/africa-competition-law-a-year-in-review-2021/
[30] MSN. (n.d.). https://www.msn.com/en-za/news/other/competition-commission-presses-ahead-to-concourt-with-currency-manipulation-case-against-banks/ar-BB1hSENn
[31] And the National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 (Act 691) to some extent
[32] As established by the Competition Act 1998
[33] As established under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA)
[34] As established by the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No. 54 of April 14, 1947 (otherwise known as the Antimonopoly Act)
[35] As established by the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2019
[36] Although the argument could be made that institutions like the Ghana Standards Authority, the Bank of Ghana and the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission amongst others are meant to undertake consumer protection.
[37] See for example the Ghana News Agency story of 30th March 2023 titled “Ghana must enforce competition law without delay – Stakeholders.” <https://gna.org.gh/2023/03/ghana-must-enforce-competition-law-without-delay-stakeholders/>
[38] https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Competition-Law-being-considered-by-cabinet-Trade-Minister-774735
BY; Kekeli Dzeketey Esq.
Nartey Law Firm is a leading corporate and commercial law firm in Ghana providing legal services to individuals, domestic and international businesses. Ensuring the success of our clients’ objectives is at the core of what we do. Comprised of a dedicated team of lawyers with extensive experience in corporate, commercial and international law and litigation, we pride ourselves with the diligent execution of all client matters, whilst guaranteeing an uncompromising standard with respect to excellence in service delivery. Some of our focus areas are Real Estate, Intellectual Property, Energy, Trade and Commerce, Banking and Finance, Regulatory Advisory, Capital Markets and Mergers and Acquisitions.
CONTACT:
NARTEY LAW FIRM
TEL: +233 (0)553508582
Email:info@narteylaw.com